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Power and Diplomacy
Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace. By
Timothy W. Crawford. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. Pp.
x, 275. Price: $ 39.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Derek D. Smith.
Deterrence theory typically focuses on direct efforts by one state to
discourage another from attacking it. In Pivotal Deterrence, by contrast,
Timothy Crawford seeks to explain why states succeed or fail in preventing
third parties from waging war against each other. According to Crawford,
Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston College, a state's ability to
be an effective "pivot" and ward off conflict will depend primarily on the
alignment options of the potential adversaries (p. 5). States with many allies
from which to choose will feel less constrained by the risk of abandonment or
opposition, whereas those that depend on the pivot's support will be more
susceptible to deterrence tactics. In essence, pivotal deterrence works by
blurring the balance of power between states, creating what Crawford terms
an "'uncertainty effect' (p. 20). Without knowing where the pivot state's
allegiance lies, adversaries will proceed cautiously or compete in efforts to
ingratiate themselves with the pivot to secure its support or neutrality.
Because a pivot state's leverage is derived from its influence on the balance of
power and its likelihood to intervene in a conflict, Crawford hypothesizes that
pivotal deterrence will most likely succeed when pivot states are strong and
have significant interests at stake. This may be an intuitive and
unobjectionable conclusion, but the devil is in the details when Crawford tries
to create a generalizable theory of pivotal deterrence. The messy facts of real
world events confound his attempt to systematize the facts and make policy
recommendations.
Crawford uses four main case studies to demonstrate how incredibly
complex strategic calculations can be, particularly on a multilateral level. The
Eastern Crisis of 1875-78, when Germany prevented Russia and Austria-
Hungary from fighting over the Balkans, is contrasted with the events of July
1914, when Great Britain tried in vain to deter France, Russia, Germany, and
Austria from battle. Two Cold War studies show the United States using its
leverage to try to keep peace among its allies and strategic partners: the
Cyprus Crises of 1963-67, where NATO partners Greece and Turkey nearly
came to blows over the disputed island; and the Kashmir Conflict of 1962-65,
which raised the specter of war between India and Pakistan. Not surprisingly,
the pivot's effectiveness varied widely across these studies. Some leaders had
it easy, such as Otto von Bismarck during the Eastern Crisis. Germany at the
time enjoyed preponderant strength that would undoubtedly have made it a
"kingmaker" in any conflict. Bismarck could thus restrain his bellicose
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neighbors by declaring that Germany would oppose any side that initiated
aggression. Conversely, Britain's foreign minister Sir Edward Grey had a
nearly impossible task in restraining the continental powers from surging
headlong into World War I in July of 1914. Crawford argues that the war was
"overdetermined." The alliances between Germany and Austria on one side,
and France and Russia on the other, made Britain's influence as a pivot
negligible (p. 77).
Comprising the vast majority of the book, Crawford's four cases are
interesting mini-histories based on impeccable research. Their exhaustive
attention to detail, however, also highlights their shortcomings. In the sections
on Cyprus and Kashmir in particular, Crawford seems more intent on
chronicling every twist and turn of the negotiations than on connecting the
story to an overarching theory of pivotal deterrence.
Equally troubling is the relative lack of attention given to post-Cold War
cases. The penultimate chapter deals with Kosovo and Taiwan in a fairly
sparse and perfunctory manner, which seems surprising given the vastly
different strategic implications of the ongoing tensions surrounding those
areas. The current international dynamic based on U.S. unipolarity is entirely
different from the multipolar and bipolar systemic structure of the major case
studies. Yet while one might expect U.S. military predominance to enhance
Washington's leverage as a pivot, the gradual consolidation of a common
European foreign policy and the increasing assertiveness of Chinese
diplomacy will likely distort any traditional triadic pivotal deterrence
situations. In addition, the multilateral context of the nonproliferation
negotiations with both North Korea and Iran demonstrate that U.S. interests
are not as unitary nor U.S. influence as all-encompassing as during the Cold
War.
The major weakness of Crawford's theory is that there is little to
distinguish it from a traditional balance-of-power analysis. Crawford
examines the military balance from a broader perspective than most scholars,
placing greater emphasis on the possible input of third-party interveners, but
the basic strategic calculations remain the same. In essence, pivotal deterrence
operates only on the margins, since states will make decisions about war
based primarily on a direct comparison of military capabilities. Moreover, a
third party's leverage will depend on the strength of its interests and the
likelihood that it will use force to back up its preferences. Crawford
occasionally acknowledges the impact of direct deterrence based on military
superiority-Turkey, for instance, had a dominant advantage in the Cyprus
conflict-but relegates this perhaps determinative factor to the status of an
alternative hypothesis and does not incorporate it directly into his model.
When looking at a contemporary case such as Taiwan, it is difficult to
draw inferences for American foreign policy from Crawford's theory. Based
on the alignment options, the U.S. policy of "'strategic ambiguity"' should
have a powerful restraining effect on both the People's Republic of China and
Taiwan. Only the United States could punish China for attempting a cross-
channel assault, and Taiwan is heavily reliant on American arms (p. 187).
Crawford admits, however, that China was likely deterred in the 1995-96
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Taiwan Strait crisis primarily by Taiwan's air superiority and the difficulty of
mounting an amphibious attack-not by pressure from Washington. Likewise,
according to Crawford, Taiwan was probably "deterred from declaring
independence by the fearsome consequences of a Chinese missile barrage on
Taipei," not by any threat to the future supply of U.S. arms to the island (p.
196). What do these facts imply regarding the capacity of the U.S. to effect
pivotal deterrence? Crawford seems undecided over whether strategic
ambiguity is a sensible approach or whether--counter to his theory-strategic
clarity may be more appropriate. The defensive advantages Taiwan enjoys
make the prospect of its declaring independence a genuine danger, especially
given the recent electoral successes of the more confrontational Democratic
Progressive Party and the ambitious program of President Chen Shui-bian.
Taiwanese leaders may see the blurred lines of American support more as an
invitation to adventurism and risk-taking than a robust deterrent. The United
States could still act as a decisive pivot, but at some point remaining aloof
may signal nonintervention, in which case the local military balance of power
will predominate.
In sum, Pivotal Deterrence is a well-written and thoughtful book on a
topic which has struggled to free itself from a Cold War mindset. It features
impressively detailed case studies that are a riveting read and a useful primer
for those unfamiliar with the historical events. Crawford's intuition that third
parties can be decisive in determining the outcome of crises is accurate, but he
overreaches in attempting to develop an overarching theory to explain how
states ought to practice pivotal deterrence. The ability and desire of pivot
states to intervene is all part of the balance of power, and to focus exclusively
on one party in this balance is to miss the forest for the trees.
Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning Without War. By Philip B.
Heymann. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. Pp. xiii, 210. Price:
$24.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Nicholas Stephanopoulos.
Ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George
W. Bush has argued that America is a nation at war. "Our war on terror... is
only begun," he declared in the 2002 State of the Union address. "History has
called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and
our privilege to fight freedom's fight." ' As the 2004 presidential campaign
commenced, Bush labeled himself a "war president" in a closely watched
Meet the Press interview. 2 Meanwhile, Vice President Dick Cheney attacked
the Democratic Party nominee, Senator John Kerry, for "embrac[ing] the
strategy of the 1990s" and "treat[ing] attacks on our nation primarily as
matters of law enforcement and intelligence." 3
1. President George W. Bush, 2002 State of the Union (Jan. 29, 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11 .html.
2. Meet the Press: Interview with President George W. Bush (NBC television broadcast,
Feb. 8, 2004), http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4179618/.
3. Vice President Dick Cheney, Remarks at a Reception for Senator Jim Bunning (March
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Harvard Law School Professor Philip Heymann thinks the Bush
administration has it wrong. In his new book, Terrorism, Freedom, and
Security: Winning Without War, Heymann argues that "war" is a misleading
and inaccurate metaphor for the United States' struggle against terrorism. This
terminology, according to Heymann, obscures the many U.S. policy options
short of military force, encourages the government to sacrifice civil liberties in
the name of enhanced security, and damages U.S. relations with other
countries. Coming at a point when the Bush administration's handling of the
terrorist threat is perhaps the pivotal issue in American public life, Heymann's
critique of Bush's foreign policy is exceptionally timely-and makes an
excellent outline for Democrats to follow as the 2004 campaign progresses.
Unfortunately, Heymann's prescriptions for the array of steps that the United
States should take to combat terrorism are weaker than his critical assessment
of the actions that it is taking. Policy-makers will find little guidance in this
book about how better to make the agonizing choices between freedom and
safety, or between amicable foreign relations and the unilateral pursuit of
American interests.
Heymann most explicitly criticizes the bellicose terminology of Bush's
"war on terror" in the first part of his book. "'War,"' he writes, "is neither a
persuasive description of the situation we face nor an adequate statement of
our objectives" (p. 19). The many differences between what Heymann
considers "real" wars and the contemporary struggle against terrorism include:
the massive commitment of attention, energy, and resources demanded by real
wars, far outweighing the more manageable burden of combating terrorism;
the primacy enjoyed by the military in real wars, as opposed to the centrality
of the intelligence agencies in antiterrorist efforts; and the temporary nature of
real wars, compared to the indefinite terrorist threat (p. 1). The language of
war is also unhelpful, according to Heymann, because it simplifies the
multifaceted danger of terrorism-which includes not only the threat of
spectacular September 11-style attacks but also smaller-scale bombings,
cyberterrorism, and other menaces. Inaccurate rhetoric thus puts Washington
policymakers in a myopic haze, and they become "less likely to develop
different remedies for different dangers" (p. 26). Furthermore, casting the
fight against terrorism in warlike terms implies greater knowledge of the
enemy than the United States in fact possesses. It also grants adversaries "the
dignity of parity" with the United States (p. 27).
In this section, and indeed throughout the book, Heymann adopts an
overly formalistic view of the term "war." Just as the war on poverty was
fought without sending tanks into inner-city ghettoes and rural Appalachia, so
too the war on terror need not resemble the Battle of the Bulge. Even though
the term can sometimes refer to all-encompassing struggles for survival, it can
also identify a wide range of lesser conflicts with varying degrees of
conventionality; it is, fundamentally, a flexible concept amenable to metaphor.
Still, Heymann's terminological critique has real force. In addition to
highlighting the many problematic assumptions conveyed by a simple
12, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040314.htm.
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linguistic choice, it arms critics of the administration with a much-needed
rejoinder to the argument that September 11 "changed everything."
In the final part of the book, Heymann explores the potential negative
consequences of the Bush administration's foreign policy for civil liberties at
home and U.S. relations with its allies abroad. In the chapter on civil liberties,
Heymann locates possible antiterrorism actions in three intersecting
categories: steps that reduce the probability and harm of terrorism, steps
dangerous to democratic liberties or national unity, and steps that mitigate
public fear and anger. The most difficult policies to appraise are those that
simultaneously combat terrorism and undermine civil liberties. For such
actions, writes Heymann, Americans can do little but rely on the wisdom and
courage of their elected leaders. Unfortunately, the choices the Bush
administration has made-authorizing the indefinite detention of persons
suspected of terrorist involvement, creating military tribunals outside the
criminal justice system, and shunning legislative involvement and judicial
review-indicate a desire "to go as far as legally possible in protecting even
limited amounts of security without consideration of the long-term costs in
democratic freedoms" (p. 90).
With regard to U.S. foreign relations, similarly, Heymann argues that
"the Bush administration has . . . been consuming-not building-that
intangible capital" that accrues from the respect and admiration of other
countries (p. 122). Though one would never know it from the administration's
bravado, this intangible capital is invaluable. International cooperation is
required to accomplish many of America's most important goals, and
American "soft power" rests largely on the values the United States has
historically represented on the world stage.
Like the earlier section on the inappropriate "war" rhetoric, these policy
chapters mount a persuasive critique of the Bush administration's handling of
the struggle against terrorism. Heymann is weaker, though, when he turns to
considering how to strike a more appropriate balance between individual
liberties, cordial diplomacy, and national security. The critical question of
what to do "when there is a true conflict between greater security and
preserving historical democratic freedoms" produces only the answer that "we
must do our best to choose wisely" (p. 90). Heymann also outlines various
proposals that give rise to constitutional concerns-increasing the
government's surveillance powers over aliens, creating a criminal incitement
offense, and making membership in certain groups a crime-but fails to reach
conclusions about the relative merit of any of these steps. And although he
presents the many advantages of cooperative multilateralism, he never
discusses what weight they should be given when the interests of the United
States and its allies diverge.
In between the initial chapters on the Bush administration's faulty
rhetoric and the final chapters on its faulty policies, Heymann attempts to
make his own policy prescriptions in order "to develop as complete a menu as
possible of ways to recreate safety and reduce fear" (p. 37). By this measure,
he clearly succeeds. He offers an extremely comprehensive list of actions that
Washington can take to combat terrorism: reduce enthusiasm abroad for
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attacks; deter attacks through law enforcement and military force; deny
terrorists access to potential targets, gather intelligence on suspicious
individuals and groups; disrupt plots through criminal prosecution and
detention; and so on. The trouble, though, is that a thorough menu of
counterterrorist options is not especially useful. Many of the steps outlined
have already been taken. Others are described at such a high level of
generality (e.g. "showing concern for the well-being-the nutrition, health,
education, governance, and human rights-of Muslim populations around the
world") as to be effectively useless (p. 44). Most important, Heymann
neglects in these chapters to consider the implications of his different
proposals for civil liberties and foreign relations. As a result, the reader is
unable to decide whether some or all of Heymann's policies should be
implemented-because, as he later explains, the potential to reduce terrorism
must always be weighed against possible corrosive consequences for freedom
and international cooperation.
Terrorism, Freedom, and Security therefore meets the first of the two
requirements for any robust alternative to the Bush administration's
counterterrorism approach. That is, it adeptly points out the many deficiencies
of the "war on terror" as understood and executed by President Bush: the
unhelpful terminology of warfare; the excessive focus on short-term danger
reduction; the erosion of civil liberties; and the damage to U.S. diplomacy and
its perception abroad. Heymann, however, does not meet the second crucial
requirement for any new counterterrorism strategy: a precise description of
what steps it would entail; what values it would secure; and how it would
differ from the status quo. Although readers will have to look elsewhere for a
coherent and persuasive alternative to Bush's war on terror, this book offers a
successful critique of the current administration's policy, and contains many
ideas that will inevitably become part of any rival approach.
After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy. By Noah
Feldman. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003. Pp: 260. Price:
$24.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Sameera Fazili.
Are Islam and democracy compatible? Even if so, can a democratic
system survive if Islamist parties are allowed to participate? The answer to
both questions is yes, according to Noah Feldman, Assistant Professor of Law
at New York University Law School who served as Senior Advisor for
Constitutional Law to the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority's Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq. In After Jihad, Feldman
gives a whirlwind overview of politics in the contemporary Muslim world in
order to convince his reader, and wider policy circles, to accept his optimistic
prognosis.
If Feldman is right, the stakes in Muslim countries today are higher than
at any time in the past twenty-five years. He believes political Islam has
moved from an era of espousing violent revolutionary rhetoric-leading in the
most extreme case to the 1979 Iranian revolution-into a "post-Jihad" era
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where Islamists seek political ends through peaceful methods (p. 232). But
even if this argument is true a crucial question remains: what happens "after
jihad?"
The answer to this question, argues Feldman, will depend on how both
Muslim and Western governments react to the changes that are sweeping the
region. In his view, Islamic democracy is possible, but not inevitable. To
support this argument he offers a theoretical discussion of the compatibility of
Islam and democracy, then a look at politics in the contemporary Muslim
world, and finally a discussion of how the United States and other Western
governments can facilitate the growth of democracy in Muslim lands.
In Part One, the "Idea of Islamic Democracy," Feldman proposes that
Islam and democracy are compatible because they are both "mobile ideas" (p.
32). Democracy is based on theoretical notions such as sovereignty and
equality that have, in practice, yielded systems as varied as the U.S.
constitutional democracy, the British parliamentary system, and Germany's
Weimar Republic. Thus in the Muslim world, Feldman would prefer to see the
implementation of democracy in the form of a range of basic rights and
freedoms, rather than merely a replica of American-style government. "The
institutions of Islamic democracy will not look precisely the same as
American democratic institutions, nor should they," he asserts, pointing to the
example of India's unique liberal democracy (p. 208). He also reminds the
reader continually that even Western democracies struggle over how to
guarantee rights and personal liberties, and have been "riddled with
inequalities along the axes of race, sex, and citizenship" (p. 78).
Similarly, Islam "comprises a complex set of contested ideas, values,
and beliefs" (p. 21). Feldman supports this argument with a passionate
discussion of Islam's historic diversity of thought and tolerance. Here he self-
consciously seeks to distance himself from Orientalist writings, which reduce
Muslim actors into passive, irrational agents, and he offers refreshing
perspectives on the vitality, malleability, and diversity of Islamic law in
particular. Essentially, Feldman wants both Muslims and Western
governments to break out of their belief in the false dichotomy between Islam
and democracy. This myth labels Muslims who advocate democracy and
modernization as illegitimate and inauthentic to their religious tradition, since
"the ideas associated with Islam are unchangeable or unchanging" (p. 230).
By contrast, Feldman argues that contemporary Muslims have been able to
use their own religious, intellectual, and legal traditions to construct Islamic
defenses of democratic values.
If democracy and Islam are both "mobile ideas" capable of
transformation and translation into many different contexts, they are also
susceptible to combination. Social Democracy, for example, melds socialism
and democracy. National Socialism, for its part, married ethnic nationalism
and "scientific" socialism. Feldman sees far more positive consequences from
the marriage of Islam and democracy: "[c]ommitted to equality, and blessed
by flexibility, these two universal ideas may potentially be good partners in
the search for a provisional synthesis" (p. 78).
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This hopefulness leads Feldman to insist that Muslims should be given
the space and opportunity to create a democracy with Islamic content. Islamic
law should not necessarily govern exclusively; the system instead may draw
"on Islam's values and ideals while simultaneously incorporating democratic
principles, legal protections, and institutions" (p. 25). Feldman argues that an
Islamist democracy is better than autocracy, since accountability and
representation should provide for more consistent enforcement of the rule of
law. Infusing Islamic language, notions, and principles into provisional
constitutions does not necessarily doom emerging nations to an anti-liberal,
anti-democratic future.
But how do the facts on the ground support Feldman's theory? The
second section of the book, on the "Variety of Islamic Democracy," looks at
how democracy and Islam are interacting in the contemporary Muslim world.
Feldman attempts to summarize the pre- and post-colonial history and
contemporary politics of every Muslim-majority country in the world, in less
than ten pages per country. If that sounds like a tall order, it is. Moreover,
Feldman's real interest seems to be the fate of democracy in the Arab world,
despite the fact that Arabs constitute less than 20 percent of the world's
Muslim population.
Additionally, each country Feldman examines has a different history of
engagement with its religious organizations-whether violent repression,
political inclusion, or political exclusion-and a different response by those
organizations, who if included may integrate quite well into electoral politics
(as in Jordan) or if excluded from politics may turn to social organizing (as in
Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood) or violent tactics (as in Algeria).
Ultimately, Feldman cannot prove that Islam and democracy will unite in a
harmonious way. Nevertheless, he insists that, regardless of the differences
among states, democratization should be encouraged, not stifled, throughout
the Muslim world.
The book's final section is devoted to explaining the role the United
States should play. Here, again, Feldman has a heavy Arab focus that largely
excludes Turkey and Iran, key states in any discussion of Islamic politics. And
again, his thesis is not surprising: long-term American interest lies in
supporting democratization in the Arab world, even a democratization that is
Islamic in flavor and content. Failing to promote democratization, he warns,
incurs the risk of generating revolution, as occurred in Iran in 1979. In his
calculation, it is "less costly to manage known risk than it is to confront
unknowable risk" (p. 197). The "known risk" of increased self-expression and
political participation, in Feldman's view, is short-term instability. In the long
run, democracy will breed stability and predictability in Muslim politics, in
turn leading to more harmonious interactions with the United States (and even
potentially with Israel), particularly as shared democratic values emerge.
But are the risks of Muslim democratization, in fact, "known?" And are
they necessarily worth the benefits? Herein lies the greatest weakness of
Feldman's argument, since he cannot prove that a gradual transition to
democracy will be more predictable and stable than maintaining the status
quo. Rather than even attempt to prove the case, he resorts to a high-minded
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Wilsonian tone, urging America to "do the morally right thing" and be a
superpower based on principle (p. 204).
Feldman adopts a quite strident tone with his unabashed interventionist
leanings. But he has a refreshing determination not to predict or propose
specific outcomes. Encouraging democratization will not automatically lead to
the Islamization of politics, he reminds the reader, since "Muslims ... are not
pre-programmed to embrace Islamist politics, as indeed most of the history of
the twentieth century proves" (p. 215). Turkey, for example, is a Muslim state
that moved towards greater democracy due to a combination of American and
European strategic alliance and economic leverage. And although Islamists
reclaimed power in 1995, their electoral success has not led to any assertion of
civilizational incompatibility with Western democracy. Quite on the contrary,
the Islamist Justice and Development Party has accelerated efforts to bring
Turkey into the European Union.
Muslims deserve the chance to at least have a choice of whether they
want a democracy or not, according to Feldman. They might very well opt for
a different form of government, but Feldman wants to allow the people the
choices that they are being denied today, a denial that the United States
supports both implicitly and explicitly to the extent that it supports
authoritarian governments throughout the region. Readers may disagree with
his tone, which is almost that of an evangelical liberal: he self-consciously
tries to distance himself from Orientalist academics, who see the Muslim
world as irrational and uncivilized, yet he also promotes aggressive U.S.
interventions in Muslim states, from political and economic cooperation to
sanctions to the use of force if need be. Feldman has waded into a highly
contentious political debate, and the coming years may well put many of his
ideas to the test.
The Global Expansion of Judicial Review
Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New
Constitutionalism. By Ran Hirschl. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2004. Pp. 286. Price: $49.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Stephen
Townley.
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down those provisions of Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act that rendered states liable for monetary damages. The Court
questioned the Act's factual predicate and ruled that its passage exceeded the
limited power granted Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment. Around the
world, such blunt assertions of judicial authority, and the strong judiciaries
that make them, are proliferating. Even questions of national identity-such as
whether Quebec is entitled to secede from Canada-are being litigated. In
Towards Juristocracy, Ran Hirschl, Associate Professor of Political Science at
the University of Toronto, attempts to "place the dramatic manifestations of
the expansion of judicial review [in the United States] ... within a broader
context" (p. 223). Hirschl's analysis of the origins of what he calls the "new
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constitutionalism" is both fascinating and compelling. But his conception of
the consequences of this phenomenon is thin and his empirics are
questionable.
Hirschl begins by debunking the three classical explanations for
constitutional transformation: evolutionist, functionalist, and institutional-
economic. Evolutionists see judicial review as the inevitable by-product of the
human rights movement. Proponents of the functionalist and economic
rubrics, on the other hand, see the creation of a stable, extra-political legal
regime as a necessary prerequisite to political development and economic
advance, respectively. But as Hirschl astutely points out, none of these
paradigms offers an adequate explanation for scenarios where "no apparent
transition" is taking place (p. 8). Why, for instance, did "members of the
Canadian polity ... [choose] to take steps against their own imperfections [by
promulgating the Charter of Rights and Freedoms] in the year they did and not
earlier or later" (p. 36)?
In opposition to these traditional theories, Hirschl advances a
controversial but plausible hypothesis: the judicialization of rights and
national efforts to boost the salience of judicial review are "means by which
preexisting and ongoing sociopolitical struggles are carried out" (p. 99). In
other words, the new constitutionalism is a "form of self-interested hegemonic
preservation" whereby "threatened political elites . ..preserve or enhance
their political hegemony by insulating ... their policy preferences .. .from
the vicissitudes of democratic politics" (pp. 11-12).
To support his thesis, Hirschl analyzes major constitutional
developments in Canada, New Zealand, Israel, and South Africa. He starts his
investigation with little more than a hunch that absent political pressure, and
unless faced with potential electoral loss, rational politicians are unlikely to
expose their policies to the vagaries of an independent judiciary. Research
confirms his intuition. Hirschl painstakingly points out the growth of anti-
establishment forces in each nation he studies just prior to its adoption of a bill
of rights or proto-constitution. In Israel, he explains that the governing secular
and anti-statist "bloc lost more than one-third of its relative combined
electoral power between 1981 and 1999" (p. 57). In response, Israeli leaders
entrenched protection for fundamental rights and liberties in two new basic
laws-Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation. Likewise, in Canada, Hirschl urges that the popular Quebec
separatist movement "changed the political incentive structure" such that
elites "found majoritarian politics not to their advantage" (pp. 76-77). It was
for this reason, he maintains, that Canada passed the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms in 1982. Both Canada's Charter and Israel's new basic laws gave
the national courts new grounds upon which to strike down legislation.
Hirschl's argument about the cause of constitutional transformation is
persuasive at least in part because he offers an alternative to the platitudes
often heard that "stress the deep commitment of political leaders . . .to the
protection of fundamental civil liberties" (p. 76). His account squares with a
realist understanding of politics.
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Nevertheless, for all he tries to paper it over, Hirschl's logic rests on a
syllogism of uncertain stability: the major premise is that embattled political
elites are likely to look for alternative means of securing influence; the minor
premise is that judges appointed by these conservative elites will safeguard
the policies of their patrons; the conclusion is that the more things change, the
more they stay the same. In other words, elites will use constitionalization as a
way of "avoid[ing] or delay[ing] unwanted political outcomes" (p. 15). Yet
appointing cronies to the bench can never be more than a stop-gap solution. If
the old guard's fear of electoral defeat is well founded, someone else will be
picking the next set of judges. As national politics shift, an appointed court's
stance on the issues of the day cannot but evolve. Hirschl fails, moreover, to
discuss other, structural ways in which political elites may use the judiciary to
try to put off policy reversal for as long as possible. The Canadian Court is,
for instance, explicitly factionalized (by province) while the Israeli Court is
not; when political threats emanate from one particular geographical area, the
Canadian design may cabin dissent. Likewise, if elites know they only have
one shot at judicial selection, they may want to endow judges with life tenure,
hoping to entrench their policies in custom and make subsequent reversal
more difficult. Finally, if, as in Israel, an elite faces challenge in the
legislature but not a battle for executive control, that elite may want to reserve
to the executive branch the power to initiate the appointment process.
After concluding that new constitutionalism is politics by other means,
Hirschl analyzes the phenomenon's consequences. After empirical study, he
concludes that judicial organs have protected negative rights (classic civil
liberties that constrain the state) but not positive rights (those that require state
action). Indeed, while freedom of speech, for instance, has enjoyed extensive
protection, a substantive welfare right has not. This work seems to be one of
the first attempts at comparative constitutional empirics; that said, however,
Hirschl's taxonomy is somewhat vulnerable. As he acknowledges, rights do
not lend themselves to easy classification. For example, clauses that guarantee
racial equality may entail both a negative right (the state may not distinguish
on the basis of race) and a positive fight (the state must take active steps to
eradicate the traces of caste).
Hirschl concludes on something of a defeatist note: even if courts were
to provide "a more generous judicial interpretation of these [positive] rights,"
it is unlikely that the lot of the impoverished "would significantly improve"
(p. 220). He notes that when courts have handed down decisions out of synch
with a nation's political climate, backlash has forced reconsideration. He
points to the swift reversal of the Shah Bano decision in India; within a year
of a Supreme Court decision that affirmed the pre-eminence of a national
alimony statute over Muslim law, the Indian Parliament "bowed to massive
political pressure ... by passing the Muslims Women's ... Act" (p. 203).
Because Hirschl's theory is "actor-oriented," it does not lend itself to
making predictions or policy recommendations (p. 49). Moreover, whether a
polity chooses to entrench rights in a constitution seems to depend on the
development of adversary politics-a pure contingency. Hirschl also leaves
the reader with many unanswered questions. As he notes, for instance, he has
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studied nations where the courts were respected; would his conclusion obtain
were this not the case? Despite its flaws, Towards Juristocracy makes two
important contributions to the scholarship on judicial review: as an empirical
and truly comparative work in a field where few are, and as an alternative to
the almost uncontroverted praise for constitutionalization.
Courts and Political Institutions: A Comparative View. By Tim Koopmans.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xxi, 299. Price:
$35.00 (Paperback). Reviewed by Philippa Webb.
Where does the line between law and politics fall? In 2004, the U.S.
Supreme Court is considering the legality of the detention of "enemy
combatants" at Guantdnamo Bay and reviewing the President's exercise of his
authority as commander-in-chief in the process. The German Federal
Constitutional Court has protected the right to privacy by ordering the
government to limit the scope of electronic surveillance. In France, the
banning of headscarves in schools due to an alleged violation of the separation
between church and state has engaged the attention of both the government
and the courts. Judicial scrutiny and political action are clearly occupying the
same field.
Tim Koopmans, in Courts and Political Institutions: A Comparative
View, offers a careful examination of the legal relations between political
institutions and the courts in four countries-the United States, Great Britain,
France, and Germany (with some references to Italy, the Benelux countries,
and Canada)-in an effort to document and explain the shifting boundaries
between judicial and political activities. As a former Professor of
Constitutional Law at the University of Leiden and Judge on the European
Court of Justice, Koopmans brings the perspectives of both the academic and
the practitioner to these issues.
In his four case studies, Koopmans finds that subjects that are highly
political in one country are treated as legal issues in another. For example, in
the United States, the introduction of the death penalty is a political issue to
be decided by each state government, but in Western Europe it is treated as a
legal issue because the European Convention on Human Rights prohibits
capital punishment. However, this legal/political distinction is not stable. The
U.S. Supreme Court is hearing two cases on the legality of capital punishment
in different situations (the execution of juveniles and the failure of the
government to provide consular notice). Such instability is to be expected,
since Koopmans's study of the case law in the four jurisdictions leads him to
argue that the relationship between courts and political institutions is in flux
and the line between law and politics is being blurred in many areas.
Koopmans identifies three trends that are altering the boundary between
law and politics. First, Koopmans discusses increasing judicialization. The
courts in many countries are having a growing influence on "matters which
were once considered purely political" (p. 268). This influence arises from the
extension of the jurisdiction of the courts and the declining deference given to
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assessments made by public authorities. While judicialization has no single
cause-it can be the result either of legislative reform or the action of the
courts themselves-there is some evidence that jurisdictions are influencing
each other. For instance, when the experience of dictatorships and world wars
shook Europe's faith in the reliability of political institutions, the American
model of judicial review established by Marbury v. Madison set the tone for
constitutional debate in many European countries. European courts are now
also reviewing administrative actions, a trend which began in France. The
number of cases that are non-justiciable appears to be shrinking, as illustrated
by the demise of the "political question doctrine" in the United States (p. 101).
Nonetheless, the realm where courts will not tread has not completely
disappeared. Courts in France and Germany have respectively found the
President's decision to proclaim a state of emergency and the licensing system
for the construction and operation of nuclear reactors to be beyond the scope
of judicial review.
Second, Koopmans argues that at least two forces are undermining the
stability of constitutional law. The first, more specific, force is the influence
of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.
European national courts are paying attention to the supranational courts'
interpretation of individual provisions of European Community Law and the
European Convention on Human Rights, are placing less emphasis on national
codes and statutes as primary sources of law, and are adopting a more
purpose-oriented, creative judicial approach. The second, more general, force
affecting constitutional law is globalization. "some problems are being
internationalized to such a degree that the State is no longer able to provide
solutions" (p. 263). For example, European Union institutions are increasingly
influential in many legal, political, and social matters such as environmental
regulations, labor laws, and access to social services that used to be decided
solely by national entities. Unfortunately, Koopmans does not explore the
influence of international bodies like the International Court of Justice or the
World Trade Organization's Appellate Body.
Third, the growing significance and complexity of international human
rights law over the past fifty years has also shifted the line between law and
politics. Koopmans persuasively argues that human rights protections have
increased the power of the judiciary. The growth of human rights law has
enabled courts to intervene in matters previously left to political institutions,
changed the perception of the judiciary's task to that of the protector of
citizens, and added a new dimension to judicial review. The starkest
illustration of the impact of human rights law on courts is in the Netherlands.
Dutch courts do not possess the power to review legislation, but they can
strike down statutes for being incompatible with rights enshrined in the
European Convention on Human Rights. This system of "semi-review" has
resulted in a line of case law in which Dutch judges have used their
autonomous view of the meaning of certain human rights to scrutinize the
provisions of the Civil Code (p. 44).
Courts and Political Institutions makes a valuable and rare comparative
contribution to constitutional scholarship. Koopmans's examination of the
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constitutional jurisprudence and practice of four countries allows for
sometimes surprising comparisons and contrasts that cut across the
civil/common law dichotomy. For example, there is a strong similarity in the
authority of the president in French and American constitutional law because
they both possess independent executive powers.
However, some readers may be frustrated by Koopmans's neutral
approach to his subject matter. In his view, "[c]omparative studies help us to
understand things, but they are a poor guide to determining what is 'good' or
'bad' because the wisdom of choices that different countries have made
depends on multiple background factors, many of which are non-legal (p.
282). While Koopmans's straightforward justification of his neutrality is
admirable, his refusal to make value judgments makes the study feel
somewhat incomplete. The project of understanding a legal system, or even a
single constitutional doctrine, is bound up with value judgments. Koopmans
artificially separates the description of the differences among the four legal
systems from an evaluation of the positive and negative consequences of those
differences. Academics, legislators, and judges regularly search for solutions
to shared problems through comparative law techniques. Even though
constitutional law is inevitable closely bound to a country's history and
culture-even more closely than in more technical areas of the law such as
contract-there is still room to learn from others.
Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases.
By Tom Ginsburg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp.
xi, 295. Price: $70.00 (Hardback). Reviewed by Anita Wu.
Judicial review has been expanding around the world over the past
several decades. Unfortunately, academics have not kept up with the trend.
Tom Ginsburg, Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of
Illinois, is an exception. As he recognizes, the recent spread of judicial power
calls for a reexamination of the development of judicial review. Why do
countries adopt judicial review, which is often characterized as an
undemocratic practice, during periods of democratization and constitutional
design? What conditions in the early stages of democratic liberalization
support the exercise of judicial power? Moreover, new constitutional courts
vary in their design and the powers with which they are endowed. What
allows some constitutional courts to exercise the power of judicial review
more aggressively than others?
Ginsburg's Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts
in Asian Cases takes up precisely these questions. In the first half of his book,
he lays out a theory about the origins of judicial review that departs sharply
from conventional explanations. Most scholars look at the broad cultural or
societal factors that could favor the establishment of some form of judicial
review. They often attribute the creation of judicial review to a demand for
judicial protection from people newly conscious of their rights. Ginsburg
challenges this argument. He suggests that political interests may actually
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seek to supply institutions of judicial review absent popular demand. Having
laid out this theoretical framework, he then puts his arguments to the test with
a comparative analysis of recently established constitutional courts in the new
democracies of Taiwan, Mongolia, and Korea. He also helpfully grounds
these Asian case studies by drawing on material from Eastern European states
and other new democracies, as well as the history of several well-known
constitutional courts.
Ginsburg looks at the establishment and development of judicial power
under two distinct theories. The "insurance theory" explains the establishment
of the constitutional court; and the "diffusion theory" accounts for
constitutional court design and performance (pp. 25, 90). "Insurance" is
important because Ginsburg sees electoral uncertainty as the key factor
motivating democratic countries to set up an independent judiciary. When
constitutional designers are confident that they will retain political dominance
under the new system, they set up institutions that favor parliamentary
sovereignty-they will not provide built-in institutional constraints on their
expected power. On the other hand, in situations of political transition and
uncertainty, constitutional designers worry about retaining control of political
institutions. As a result, Ginsburg argues, leaders in these situations are likely
to set up a constitutional court with the power to protect the ultimate
constitutional bargain from encroachment by their successors. South Korea's
1987 constitutional reforms, for instance, occurred at a time when several
parties of roughly equal force were vying for future political power. The
parties therefore demanded a strong system of judicial review as a form of
political "insurance" against electoral loss.
Although political actors may seek to insure a new democracy through
judicial review, the degree of power that they are willing to hand over to the
court can vary. According to Ginsburg, the extent of political diffusion
explains both differences in constitutional design (i.e. the size of the
constitutional court and the length of the justices' terms) and the varying
degrees of the courts' power. In other words, where one political party
dominates, judicial review is more constrained. Where political power is
dispersed, courts have more space and freedom in which to operate and to
expand judicial power over time, both because elected officials have less
leverage to overrule or counterattack courts and because more disputes are
created for the judiciary to resolve. The dispersion of political power in South
Korea and Mongolia, for instance, led to court appointment processes where
three separate institutions each nominate one-third of the members of the
judiciary. Moreover, with South Korea's notoriously weak and
underdeveloped political parties, the Constitutional Court in that country has
correspondingly been very active, frequently striking down legislative action
and demonstrating its independence in politically charged areas such as labor
law disputes. On the other hand, because Taiwan's democratization occurred
under one dominant party (the Kuomintang Party) with a strong leader, its
Council of Grand Justices has, for the most part, been tightly controlled. The
president has exclusive appointment power, and the Council has only limited
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access to the public and can engage only in abstract review, with no power to
strike down legislation for unconstitutionality.
Ginsburg's thesis-that political interests primarily determine how
judicial power is established and developed-is lucidly argued and well
supported. Yet his argument loses credibility when he neglects to consider the
possibility that alternative explanations may in fact substantially complement
his own. For instance, some scholars have argued that constitutional designers
provide for an independent judiciary in order to protect property and trade
rights and contribute to economic growth. Other theorists suggest that cultural
dynamics greatly influence the development of judicial authority and dictate
its ability to expand. Still others believe that new democracies that rely
heavily on foreign ties are influenced by pressure from Western democracies
and supranational governing bodies to emulate Western constitutional
principles and institutions. Ginsburg acknowledges these alternative
viewpoints and concedes that they can affect the development of judicial
review. However, he subordinates their influence to the domestic political
interests that he highlights. This intransigence is surprising, given that he
undertook his project in order to rebut the view that cultural and historical
influences operate together in a single, uniform process of judicial
empowerment. Moreover, his comparative study actually lends credence to
the importance of the alternative explanations that he rejects. In his chapter on
South Korea, for instance, Ginsburg describes the constitutional court's
critical role in contributing to that country's economic liberalization by
undermining the legacy of state economic controls.
Ginsburg can be criticized not only for his overly narrow theory but also
for his attempt to generalize about the development of judicial review from
the three new democracies that he chose to study. He is correct that Taiwan,
Mongolia, and South Korea represent different political environments. Taiwan
has experienced a gradual transition to democracy and constitutionalism over
the past two decades. Mongolia, by contrast, created a constitutional court
after a clear "constitutional moment" in 1992, when a new constitution was
ratified (p. 158). South Korea, for its part, has undergone partial
democratization from a military dictatorship that ended in 1987. However, the
three countries also have crucial similarities, in that they are all heavily
influenced by imperial Chinese legal institutions and Confucian ideology. To
his credit, Ginsburg concedes that he is unable to offer definitive proof of his
theory based on these case studies, and he does briefly consider some
anecdotal cases such as post-communist Russia. He devotes very few pages to
examples drawn from the more than two centuries of judicial review in the
United States and thus fails to supplement his Asian case studies in a way that
would generate a solid basis for his theory.
In spite of its limitations, Ginsburg's approach makes a refreshing and
extraordinarily useful addition to a body of literature that has been dominated
by studies of Western (particularly American) constitutionalism and apolitical
understandings of judicial power. As a study with the self-pronounced goal of
broadening the empirical and theoretical bases of comparative constitutional
law, Ginsburg's book is highly successful. By focusing on judicial review in
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non-Western countries, and by refusing to explain the development of judicial
power in terms of the conventional cultural and social theories, Ginsburg
shifts the dialogue on constitutionalism away from culturally deterministic
accounts of judicial power and opens up a conversation that has long waited to
begin.
Law and Democracy
Sex and the State: Abortion, Divorce, and the Family Under Latin American
Dictatorships and Democracies. By Mala Htun. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003. Pp. xi, 219. Price: $60.00 (Hardcover).
Reviewed by Lea Bishop.
Feminist scholars have long identified a link between patriarchal family
structures and autocratic political regimes, and have advanced a number of
explanations for this connection. Some highlight authoritarian governments'
efforts to promote an idealized version of the male-dominated family in order
to legitimize the conception of the leader as strong father-figure. Others have
proposed that military regimes reinforce patriarchal norms by militarizing
society. Still another school of thought argues that causality runs in the
opposite direction, with citizens accustomed to autocratic government in the
family more inclined to accept it at the national level. These bodies of feminist
scholarship often assume that democratization-with its greater emphasis on
the intrinsic worth of persons, personal liberty, and the equality of citizens-
will undermine patriarchy and pave the way for feminist reforms.
Mala Htun, Assistant Professor of Political Science at New School
University, puts this assumption to the test in Sex and the State: Abortion,
Divorce, and the Family Under Latin American Dictatorships and
Democracies. Through an analysis of efforts to reform the laws regarding
spousal equality, divorce, and abortion in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, Htun
develops nine distinct case studies from which to develop generalized
findings. Surprisingly, she discovers that some military governments were
more effective in achieving feminist reforms than were the democratic
governments that succeeded them. Ultimately, she concludes that simplistic
variables such as democratic or authoritarian governance are of little use in
predicting the success of legal reforms aimed at helping improve the status
and rights of women. Instead, she explains that a reform's likelihood of
success depends on a more complex range of variables, including the politics
of the particular issue, the power of elite advocates for reform, and the
strength of opposition from the Catholic Church.
The first wave of gender reforms that Htun examines addressed
women's legal capacities within marriage. In Latin America married women
traditionally had no property rights, while men exercised sole authority over
their children as well as over their spouses. Between the 1960s and 1990s,
however, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile all adopted spousal equality reforms
that recognized the full civil capacity of married women and granted mothers
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equal parental rights. These moves occurred first under military governments
in Argentina and Brazil-and not in response to feminist activism, but as
incidents to comprehensive legal modernization efforts. In Htun's words,
"[m]ilitary governments created technical commissions charged with
modernizing the civil law, opening a privileged window of influence for
lawyers to bring cosmopolitan legal theories to bear on domestic policy. The
closed nature of these governments insulated technical decisions from societal
input, thus expediting change" (p. 5). Indeed, the commissions'
recommendations were rubber-stamped in both countries. In Chile, however,
conservative military-political elites vetoed the feminist reforms suggested by
a similar commission; women did not achieve equal status within marriage
under the law until after the 1990 transition to democratic rule.
In enacting familial equality reforms, these three Latin American
governments were following-rather than leading-the Church. As Htun
points out, Catholic doctrine had by the 1960s already endorsed the ideal of
"equal rights and duties for man and woman" within marriage (p. 32). By
contrast, in areas where the Church opposed a government's proposed
reform-such as the liberalization of divorce and abortion laws-Htun finds
that successful change depends crucially on the character of the Church-state
relationship at the particular point in time: "[d]uring periods of Church-state
cooperation, state leaders realized benefits from the Church's political support
and were unwilling to make moves that would incur episcopal wrath. When
the Church turned against the state, opportunities emerged for opposing
coalitions to step in and produce shifts in gender rights legislation" (p. 24).
The laws regarding divorce most clearly demonstrate this dynamic.
Military-governed Brazil was the first to legalize divorce, in 1977. Although
the Church vigorously opposed the move, the government, which had been the
target of harsh criticism by the clergy for its human rights abuses, was in no
mood to bend to the Church's will. In fact, Htun argues, the divorce initiative
was a deliberate attempt to undermine the Church's legitimacy by forcing it to
oppose a widely popular reform. By contrast, in Argentina, where the military
government enjoyed the support of conservative Church officials, the state
dutifully bowed to the Catholic desire to keep divorce illegal, even forbidding
the word divorcio to be spoken on television. After the restoration of
democracy in 1983, however, the Argentine Church's political influence and
legitimacy were undermined due to its collaboration with the earlier military
regime, and it was unable to prevent the legalization of divorce in 1987.
Abortion, the last issue that Htun considers, has a dynamic of its own in
Latin America. Significant liberalization of the laws against abortion has not
occurred under either military or democratic government in any of the three
countries. Despite laws prohibiting abortion in all but a few circumstances,
however, the practice is widespread. According to data cited by Htun, about a
third of pregnancies in Chile and Brazil end in abortion, an average of greater
than one per woman. Yet if the government lacks the political will to enforce
the legal prohibitions on abortion, why has public opinion not been mobilized
to decriminalize the practice? As Htun explains, "since middle-class women
generally have access to safe abortions in private clinics, many see little
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reason to press for the liberalization of abortion laws. It is primarily poor
women who suffer the consequences of clandestine abortions" (p. 6). After
examining failed attempts by military-appointed technical experts and civic
activists to decriminalize abortion, Htun concludes that apparently similar
gender-oriented issues such as abortion and divorce cannot be grouped
together into one gender policy category. "Differences among gender issues
are politically consequential. Rather than treating 'women's rights' or
'feminist policies' as a single issue area, we should disaggregate gender
issues" (pp. 1-2). Hence, she cautions that just because the path of feminist
reform led to the legalization of elective abortion in North America and
Western Europe, it may not do the same in Latin America.
While the rich and exhaustively detailed case studies will appeal to
students of Latin American political history, Sex and the State reads largely
like the dry political science treatise that it is, despite its sexy subject matter.
In the work's closing pages, however, Htun provide a brief but powerful
description of a political strategy to achieve feminist legal agendas: focus on
discrete demands for which diverse ideological coalitions can be assembled,
and be open to compromise on issues with high symbolic importance to
conservative forces. While Htun's conclusions and suggestions are helpful and
solidly supported by the evidence detailed in the preceding six chapters, she
does not attempt to integrate these findings into a more structured model that
could be applied to a broader geographic range of cases.
Htun concludes by suggesting that her findings may be relevant to
understanding the dynamics of feminist legal reform in Catholic countries
beyond Latin America, such as Poland, Spain, and Ireland. An even more
interesting possibility, however, would be to apply her framework to Islamic
states. In the Muslim world today, as in Latin America in the 1960s through
1980s, one sees patterns of autocratic statism and familial patriarchy. Htun's
work cautions against believing that Islamic democracy will inevitably bring
with it a greater concern for women's rights. To the contrary, she notes,
"democracies may be more conservative than authoritarian regimes. By
enabling citizen groups and institutions to mobilize and express their views,
democracy opens the door to both liberal and illiberal influences on gender
policy" (p. 173). Moreover, Htun warns that the power of religious institutions
is particularly great in countries without a strong civil society tradition. Thus
Htun's historical lessons and suggestions for achieving legal reform on gender
issues in Latin America may in fact be a profitable roadmap for groups
seeking similar goals in the Islamic world.
Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for
Grassroots Organizations. By Sarah L. Henderson. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2002. Pp. xii, 229. Price: $ 29.95 (Hardcover).
Reviewed by Matthew Spence.
Has civil society become the talisman of twenty-first century
democracy? Harvard political scientist Robert Putnam claims U.S. democracy
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began sputtering fifty years ago when Americans joined fewer teams, clubs,
and church groups, and instead began "bowling alone." Soon after the U.S.
government stopped dropping bombs in Kabul, it began dropping dollars to
start up the women's groups and youth leagues that the Taliban had forbidden
in its efforts to smother any spark of democracy. In Baghdad, America's new
viceroys have called upon the leaders of Iraq's unofficial civic groups not just
to help draft the post-Saddam constitution, but to help build the foundations of
what they hope will become the largest democracy in the Middle East. In
short, civil society is now a key ingredient in the West's democracy
promotion recipe. Indeed, some observers estimate that NGO development
work is a $7 billion annual industry worldwide, with $2 million pouring in
from U.S. foundations alone. Around the world, Washington spends more of
its democracy assistance dollars on civil society than on anything else.
The problem is that policymakers and scholars know very little about
how well civic promotion actually works. Sarah L. Henderson, Assistant
Professor of Political Science at Oregon State University, offers a much
needed answer. She looks at Russia, the scene of America's most ambitious
effort to build democracy over the past decade. Whereas critics savaged
Western aid for supposedly supporting the rise of corruption and crony
capitalism in the 1990s, analysts of all ideological stripes consider the
explosion of some 65,000 active nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in
Russia a bright spot of Western aid. Indeed, one of the few things that
policymakers and scholars now agree on is that even more money should go
to helping grow Russia's grassroots organizations. In fact, by the late 1990s,
Washington had placed promoting civil society at the core of its assistance
strategy toward Russia.
Henderson reverses the familiar gaze with a provocative question:
imagine that the Russian government bankrolled Human Rights Watch, the
American Medical Association, the Sierra Club, and many of America's
richest civic organizations. "How would this change the face of civic
activism? How would it alter the dynamics of how civil society works?" (p.
1). In several respects, this scenario represents an analogy to what is
happening in Russia today.
In search of an answer to her question, Henderson traversed Russia's ten
time zones as a consultant and researcher working with scores of the country's
new NGOs. She was "interested in everything from the Russian chapter of
Greenpeace to the Stamp Collector's Society," and looked at both those who
did and did not receive Western dollars (p. ix). This research design moves
her narrative beyond mere anecdotes. For that alone, Henderson's book is a
fine example of social science research.
Henderson does not break new theoretical ground. Yet she adds color
and depth to the useful emerging literature on foreign assistance to civil
society. She finds that Western funds have provided a critical financial lifeline
to several NGOs. As one Russian NGO activist who did not receive foreign
assistance told Henderson, "It is hard to think about civil society when you are
poor and have no job" (p. 152).
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Yet Henderson's analysis is most penetrating in identifying how foreign
aid exacerbates the pathologies of the Russian civic sector. As one civic leader
explains, foreign "grants are like winning the lottery out here" (p. 164).
Unfortunately, too few groups pick a winning number. The resulting
competition for funds fosters unintended and unhealthy consequences: a
supply-driven civic sector that often caters to Western funding priorities; a
growing "civic oligarchy" of an English-speaking, professional Russian NGO
elite; and a Western-funded "virtual civil society, portrayed as much more
significant and productive than it really is" (p. 166).
To be sure, working in a country of 145 million people, Western donors
must make tough choices about who gets grants. Russia's bigger and more
established groups are understandably better bets. But Henderson argues that
contrary to Western aims, much of the assistance to the largest and most
professional NGOs has not, in fact, trickled down to the groups that worked
most directly with ordinary Russians every day. "Although in many ways
foreign aid has advanced NGO development in Russia, NGO development is
not synonymous with civil society development" (p. 11).
Why has Western assistance to civil society disappointed expectations?
The answer, Henderson argues, lies not in corrupt individuals or the weight of
Russia's supposedly "undemocratic" cultural legacy. Rather, it is a question of
incentives and interests. When Western aid providers reward glitzy funding
proposals, Western-style projects, and high-tech techniques, Russian civic
leaders will rationally cater to that system. But this incentive structure does
not have to be permanent: changing Western policy is easier than changing
centuries of Russian history.
Even so, figuring out how to promote democracy abroad today is, as
Winston Churchill famously described Russia itself, "a riddle enshrined in a
mystery and wrapped in an enigma." Unfortunately, Henderson misses an
important chance to solve even more of this riddle. Namely, she treats
Western support for Russian civil society as a question of assistance, when it
would be better understood as a question of politics and diplomacy. That is,
Western governments and foundations are not merely trying to offer objective
"technical assistance" to civic groups. Part of the strategy of funding
grassroots organizations is to strengthen democracy by challenging the status
quo.
Besieged former communist governments certainly view Western
funding in this way. In the fall of 2001, for example, the Russian-language
press in Ukraine was filled with stories about how U.S.-funded NGOs had
toppled Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic. The Ukrainian government responded
by harassing NGO leaders, denying official registration to prominent groups,
and shutting down several NGO activities. Suspicious governments are all too
eager to crack down on what smacks of U.S.-sponsored NGO subversion.
The same can happen in Russia, as the book's opening anecdote reveals.
Henderson takes the reader to the outskirts of Moscow, where in 1998 she
attended a U.S.-funded seminar to train thirty Russian environmental and
human rights activists. Some four years later, she read on Lexis-Nexis that one
of the groups from that very conference had helped spearhead a voter
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referendum to require the government to seek public approval for its plans to
store and process foreign radioactive waste. "Did the indirect coaching of
Mario Cuomo and Jerry Brown, the training provided by [that US-funded
NGO], and the monetary support provided by countless Western foundations,
governments, and nonprofit organizations facilitate the emergence of this
campaign?" (p. ix).
Yet even if U.S. coaching and dollars could inspire such a campaign, it
turns out they could not protect the Russian NGO from its own government.
The group collected almost 3 million voter signatures for the referendum, but
the Central Election Commission disqualified just enough names at the last
minute to end the vote. Unfortunately, Henderson never follows up on this
disturbing story. Did the NGO ever have an impact on the policy it criticized?
Have Western governments done anything to help NGOs resist such pressure
from their government? Was this incident part of a larger pattern where civic
groups climb to the edge of political influence, only to be quickly knocked
aside by a dominating government? The reader never finds out.
Henderson's analysis mostly ignores this larger context. American and
European governments have been deeply involved in Russian domestic
politics for the past decade, but foreign aid remains among the weakest
instruments in their foreign policy toolkit. Take sheer dollars. Although the $7
billion annually used to promote civil society worldwide appears impressive
in absolute numbers, the funding is still a pittance relative to the funds flowing
to developing countries in trade, foreign direct investment, and military
assistance. Just in Russia, from 1992 to 1998, the U.S. Agency for
International Development spent $92 million on civic groups. In that same
period, Washington encouraged the IMF to extend loans to Moscow totaling
over $15 billion.
What would have happened if civil society promotion had the budget of
the IMF or World Bank in Russia? Which funds had a greater impact on
Russian democracy and political life? Did the West's prescriptions for rapid
market reform affect the environment for Russian NGOs? Did widely
unpopular foreign policy initiatives, such as NATO expansion and the war in
Kosovo, engender a backlash against groups receiving American aid just as
they did against the American government? Diplomacy creates the context
within which assistance operates. Yet Henderson does not indicate what,
beyond foreign aid, Western donors and governments could be doing to help
remove obstacles to the development of Russian civil society. That said, she
goes a long way in explaining how Western assistance for civil society
worked, what could have been done better, and why. As the West's drive to
promote democracy spreads beyond the former communist world, so should
the wisdom from Henderson's book.
China's Long March Toward Rule of Law. By Randall Peerenboom.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xvii, 673. Price:
$42.00 (Paperback). Reviewed by Michael Bretholz.
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Randall Peerenboom, Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law,
enjoys the cautious optimism of a legal scholar who has seen the law virtually
eviscerated in China and who now embraces any signs of its return. Since the
nadir of the Cultural Revolution, China has experienced an economic and
legal explosion that continues to this day. Many naysayers point out that law
cannot acquire meaningful force so long as China remains under one-party
rule with limited opportunities for political dissent. Peerenboom, on the other
hand, argues that the rule of law has acquired a new normative force in China.
A long march remains ahead, however, to enact the institutional reforms that
can inscribe the law as a true check on political and administrative power.
The sources of Peerenboom's optimism are clear. In Maoist China, the
People's Republic lacked basic laws such as a comprehensive criminal code,
civil law, or contract law. The Chinese Communist Party ruled almost by fiat
alone. Only one law was passed during the entire Cultural Revolution, from
1967 to 1976. By contrast, from 1976 to 1998, the National People's Congress
(NPC) and its Standing Committee passed 337 laws; local people's congresses
and governments issued over 6,000 regulations (some of which later became
laws) that for the first time provided citizens with a means of challenging
administrative actions. The Ministry of Justice reopened in 1979, twenty years
after its dismantlement. Law schools were founded and the number of lawyers
soared from 5,500 in 1981 to over 100,000 in 1998. In 1979, litigation was
virtually non-existent. By 1996, the total number of cases of first instance
tried before China's courts reached five million.
In addition to these institutional developments, legal consciousness is
increasing. Legal broadcasts including live trials now appear daily on radio
and television. Peerenboom is especially struck by the apparent ideological
shift from rule by law toward a rule of law that limits both government official
and citizen. He sees this shift exemplified in Jiang Zemin's 1996
announcement of an official policy-which was incorporated into the
constitution in 1999--of "ruling the country in accordance with the law and
establishing a socialist rule-of-law state" (yifa zhiguo, jianshe shuhui zhuyi
fazhiguo) (p. 6).
Peerenboom strikes a starkly different tone from the dominant views on
Chinese legal reform, which range from "extreme cynicism and skepticism to
cautious pessimism" (p. 559). Chinese legal scholar Stanley Lubman, for
example, claimed in his highly praised 2001 book, Bird in a Cage: Legal
Reforms in China After Mao, that China does not even have a legal system.
For Lubman, socialist ideology and rule of law are all but incompatible.
Indeed, as China scholar Li Shuguang has noted, there is an irony in relying
on the government to advance a rule-of-law movement, the ambition of which
is to limit the government's freedoms.
Peerenboom acknowledges this clash, but does not see it as a reason to
dismiss all signs of progress. Instead, he relaxes the standards for defining a
legal system by persuasively distinguishing between "thin" and "thick"
notions of rule of law. "Thin" conceptions emphasize the minimal conditions
that must exist in order for a legal system to function regardless of the
ideological context of the society. Laws must be made in accordance with
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legislative rules and must be generally applicable, public, prospective,
relatively clear and consistent, stable, and impartially applied and enforced.
By contrast, a "thick" conception of rule of law adds elements of political
morality, such as the economic arrangement and form of government.
The strength of Peerenboom's reform agenda, focused on strengthening
the features of a thin conception of law, lies in its ability to transcend the
ideological conflict between socialism and liberal democracy and to identify
concrete, pragmatic goals for developing rule of law in countries with diverse
political and economic conditions. Looking beyond the competing ideologies,
Peerenboom argues that institutional deficiencies pose the greatest challenges
to China's transition towards the rule of law: the judiciary is weak and poorly
trained; corruption is rampant; the legislative system is in disarray; laws are
vague and often inconsistent between levels of regulation and legislation;
regional power struggles impede the impartial implementation of the law and
so on.
Peerenboom's institutional approach is one of the great successes of
China's Long March. Ultimately, however, even the most thorough
institutional reforms will not address the political or moral concerns that have
been raised about China's legal system. As Peerenboom concedes, a thin rule
of law is only a partial success; although a "procedurally fair trial" may be a
significant achievement, it is a "hollow victory to those sent to jail under
repressive laws" (p. 135). Even once a thin rule of law is established, many
questions will remain unresolved. Indeed, few would be satisfied for long with
a standard for rule of law "that is compatible with morally reprehensible evil
empires like Nazi Germany.. ." (p. 69).
China's Long March also succeeds in another sphere by appealing to
diverse models for the rule of law. Indeed, China's civil system was to an
extent modeled on Bismarck Germany's legal institutions, transported to the
mainland via Japan's Meiji-era reforms. Peerenboom's reform proposals
therefore rely not only on American solutions but also on those born out of
civil law traditions. For example, the laws restricting Falungong, a banned
religious sect, are contrasted with counterexamples such as a corresponding,
though certainly not as severe, French law that uses criminal sanctions to limit
sects and proselytizing. Peerenboom also considers how other Asian states
have integrated a wide variety of political arrangements-liberal and non-
liberal, democratic and non-democratic, rights-centered and communitarian-
into their modern legal systems. By invoking the experiences of Taiwan and
South Korea, Peerenboom points out that it is possible, at least for a period,
for a nation to develop the rule of law in some areas, such as commercial
activity, while not meeting the same standards in other politically sensitive
domains. Here the Taiwanese and South Korean examples are perhaps
promising for another reason-as the judiciaries in both countries gained
independence and authority, they became "increasingly aggressive as reforms
progressed in interpreting and applying constitutional provisions that initially
were empty promises" (p. 62). Similar "empty promises" can be seen in
China's 1982 constitution-which has been amended four times to allow for
freer markets and most recently to profess a commitment to human rights-
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which provides for a government of laws and not men, the supremacy of the
law, and the equality of all before the law. These provisions sound promising,
but Jiang Zemin endorsed them as a tool for strengthening Communist Party
rule by reining in local governments and ensuring the supremacy of
government policies. To this day, no organ exists that has the authority to
challenge the Party's constitutional interpretation. Perhaps if the Chinese
judiciary begins to develop the strength of its counterparts in South Korea and
Taiwan, judges could begin to give meaningful force to the constitutional
words.
China's Long March has its failures. Some propositions are
unsatisfactorily supported, such as Peerenboom's startling claim that the
"[Communist] Party only rarely intervenes in specific [court] cases" (p. 307).
The nearly 700-page book is also unnecessarily repetitive, given the rich
subject matter.
Nonetheless, Peerenboom's great successes overshadow any minor
irritations. His book establishes a comprehensive vision of the Chinese legal
system. It also makes a hopeful analogy between the current legal reform
movement and Deng Xiaoping's economic program of the 1990s, when China
stood between a centrally planned economy and a market-based one. At that
time, moves toward a more active market were incremental and context-
specific. Peerenboom's institutional approach provides a comparable
prescription. Beijing continues to deny rights guaranteed by laws, it continues
to suppress civil society and political dissent, and Communist Party policies
continue to trump legislative edict. China's current system admittedly falls
short of even Peerenboom's thin rule of law. Yet China has made remarkable
progress since the Mao days and should perhaps, as Peerenboom argues, be
viewed as a system in transition toward the rule of law, albeit not a liberal
democratic one. Despite its minor flaws, China's Long March provides a
novel map for navigating the very long path ahead.
Institutions and Individuals in the Global Economy
Between Light and Shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund and International Human Rights Law. By Mac Darrow. Portland,
OR: Hart Publishing, 2003. Pp. xv, 353. Price: $80.00 (Hardcover).
Reviewed by Christine Parker.
It seems that no one has an unbiased view of the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank. Academics, development experts, and
policymakers agree that international financial institutions (IFIs) are major
players in the field of international development and finance, yet that is where
the consensus ends. To the anti-globalization forces that regularly demonstrate
their wrath in Washington and beyond, the IFIs symbolize many of the
inequities of global development. But rarely do the protestors articulate their
grievances as clearly and succinctly as Mac Darrow does in Between Light
and Shadow. Darrow, of the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for
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Human Rights, serves as Coordinator of the High Commissioner's "Human
Rights Strengthening" Joint Programme with the U.N. Development
Programme. Although Darrow is at ease with the technical jargon of the
policy wonks within the IFIs, it is evident that his allegiance lies with a
different camp.
Between Light and Shadow attempts to demonstrate how the IFIs neglect
human rights considerations in crafting policy. This neglect, according to
Darrow, has created a system of international development that essentially
furthers the international economic policy of the Group of Seven (G-7) most
economically developed states and does little to alleviate poverty in
developing nations. Darrow's most compelling argument, however, is his
critique of the IFIs' institutional setup. By deconstructing these massive,
largely opaque organizations, he demonstrates basic systemic flaws that lead
directly to their policy failures. While this section speaks to both the
protestors and the policymakers, it makes his discussion on international
human rights law seem like an afterthought. Even his proposed policy
reforms, which are aimed at incorporating international human rights law into
the work of the IFIs, look back to the underlying, structural flaws that created
these problematic institutional policies. In essence, the IFIs' failure in the
human rights arena is simply one manifestation of a much larger problem.
According to Darrow, "the chief and seemingly most intractable
weakness" of both the IMF and the World Bank "relates to the significant
under-representation of developing country interests at [the] Executive Board
level" (p. 226). G-7 nations account for a majority of the voting shares in both
institutions. For example, the United States holds 17.5 percent of the voting
shares in the IMF. Yet Fund voting rules require an eighty-five percent
majority vote to approve any program, giving Washington "an effective veto"
over IMF programs (p. 27). Moreover, as Gerald O'Discroll of the Heritage
Foundation told the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs in 1999, "[t]he US Treasury Department exercises influence over IMF
policy far in excess of the explicit percentage vote possessed by the United
States. IMF policy does not and will not deviate in any important or
fundamental way from the policy of the US Treasury" (p. 79).
As Darrow sees it, this voting regime makes IFI policy simply the
imposition of G-7 foreign economic policy on other states. It leaves the needs
of developing nations inadequately understood and addressed in both the Bank
and the Fund. One result is that developing states are reluctant to approach the
IMF for financial assistance until they reach an absolutely desperate financial
situation. When they do come for help, it is often because the Fund is the
lender of last resort-allowing it to impose what Darrow sees as unduly harsh
conditions on its loans. Like many other observers, he cites the vaunted IMF
"shock therapy" programs in Russia and East Asia after the 1997 financial
crisis as examples of unwise, overly doctrinaire Fund policies. Indeed, the
IMF has now admitted that it worsened the crisis in East Asia by
unnecessarily imposing austerity measures that created a cycle of recession
and bankruptcy and undermined the ultimate economic recovery.
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In addition, the IFIs turn what Darrow sees as a nearly blind eye to the
political and social consequences of economic reform. The institutions claim
they can legitimately focus only on the economic policy of client states; to
delve into political or social matters would unacceptably infringe on state
sovereignty. However, as Darrow notes, human rights scholar Anne Orford
has argued that globalization has created a "culture in which political
decisions that would once have been at least theoretically within the realm of
parliamentary decision-making, popular sovereignty, or democratic
government, are now made by experts in economics" (p. 82 n. 116). Economic
policies can and do significantly impact domestic politics, affecting not just
human rights but "health; education; the right to food and adequate standard
of living; women's human rights; environmental protection; employment and
labour rights; social security; and (through conditions promoting 'good
governance' and the rule of law) the framework within which civil and
political rights are exercised" (p. 112).
As one extreme example, Darrow cites the IMF's structural adjustment
programs in the former Yugoslavia in the late 1980s, which he argues
instigated country's descent into chaos and destruction in the early 1990s. The
IMF's programs "contributed to a sense of insecurity and resulting social
instability" by forcing the government to cut back spending, including food
subsidies and import subsidies, leading to rising gas and commodity prices.
Many of these reforms had a disproportionate impact on ethnic minorities,
who had been heavily dependent on government-provided social services. The
Yugoslav government lost legitimacy when it imposed the IMF reforms, says
Darrow, and citizens began to look to religious and ethnic identity for support.
Obviously, "shock therapy and structural adjustment programs have been
implemented elsewhere without leading to genocide" (p. 110). Unfortunately,
in Yugoslavia, the combination of the economic shocks and the rising ethno-
nationalist tide proved to be lethal.
As the Yugoslav example demonstrates, IFIs lack direct accountability
to the populations of their client states. Accountability in theory comes at the
national level, as democratic governments must sell IFI policy to their
domestic constituencies. But democracy is either illusory or non-existent in
many of the neediest states. Moreover, the history of the 1990s, from Latin
America to Russia, shows that elected government provides no guarantee that
local elites will not be allowed to co-opt all the benefits of IFI-imposed
policies such as privatization or trade liberalization. Nor is it certain that
bringing political leaders to account after the fact can reverse the damage from
rapidly or poorly implemented policies.
Finally, irresponsible international lending creates unsustainable debt
burdens, especially when autocratic leaders use the funds to bolster their
illegitimate regimes. When these bad debts are called in, if the debt burdens
greatly exceed the income generated through exports and foreign aid, the
recipient government may have to choose between repaying its creditors and
using the money on domestic programs to help protect its citizens' basic
rights, including human rights. For example, the Indonesian parliament has
argued that it should not have to pay back IMF loans made to the previous
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Suharto regime because the country's indebtedness "was principally due to the
obsequious support of the IMF to an extremely corrupt and incompetent
economic regime which made the regime viable and powerful" (p. 96 n.171).
Unfortunately, IFIs have what Darrow considers a habit of such irresponsible
lending. Although not included within the chapter on the IFI derogation of
international human rights law, this point is actually Darrow's strongest
argument against IFIs in that regard.
Darrow is not the first to call for greater inclusion of human rights
considerations in IFI policy, and the institutions have come up with responses
to their critics in this regard. Both the Bank and the Fund argue that although
human rights lie beyond their mandates per se, they do indirectly enhance
human rights protections to the extent that their policies help develop
economic, social, and cultural rights (the Bank) and a stable macroeconomic
foundation for social stability (the Fund). Furthermore, both institutions would
lose credibility and the support of the industrialized states if they entered "the
business of human rights promotion" directly (p. 171). This argument,
however, fails to acknowledge that the Bank, and the Fund to a lesser extent,
already have projects that focus on human rights, including HIV/AIDS
prevention projects and anti-corruption/good governance projects. But these
endeavors seem to be exceptions, not the norm.
Darrow ultimately hopes IFIs will actively incorporate human rights
protections into their mandates, but "in ways that minimize the risk of
dominant powers' disengagement from multilateral cooperation" (p. 211). In
this regard, he is far ahead of the anti-globalization protestors. He candidly
recognizes that the current structure of international finance and development
will not be radically restructured anytime soon. Furthermore, "[h]uman rights
are not 'trumps' in all situations, and should not be expected of themselves to
resolve policy trade-offs and identify optimal policy choices for development
goals" (p. 271). Once the serious flaws in the existing structure of IFIs are
addressed, human rights will be fully integrated into their policies.
Unfortunately that day remains far off.
Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the
Global Political Economy. By A. Claire Cutler. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003. Pp. xiv, 306. Price: $24.00 (Paperback).
Reviewed by Lars Viellechner.
Who are the most powerful players in the global political economy? Ask
any economist, political scientist, or average citizen, and the answers they
give would probably be quite similar: Coca-Cola, Microsoft, IBM. This is but
a sampling of the names that might come up. Yet it illustrates that private
actors, not governments or intergovernmental institutions, are increasingly
driving (and profiting from) global exchange. Does this shift imply that the
rules governing such transactions, which derive from the traditional interstate
system, are also changing?
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Yes, claims A. Claire Cutler, Associate Professor of International
Relations and Law at the University of Victoria in British Columbia, Canada.
In her view, "new sources of law are emerging which do not emanate from
public, state authority, but rather from privatized, nonstate authority" (p. 22).
Moreover, "soft law" in the form of voluntary codes of conduct and private
agreements has allegedly become the dominant mode of regulation. The task
of adjudication, for example, is increasingly conferred on private arbitration
bodies.
This transformation in legal ordering shatters the traditional distinction
between public and private international law. This traditional view defines
public international law as the law that deals with the relationship between
states, while private international law merely operates as a conflict of laws
system; it derives its ultimate authority from the domestic legal order.
Consequently, individuals and transnational corporations are "invisible" under
international law: they are "objects" and not "subjects" of the law (p. 37).
As Private Power and Global Authority reveals, the predominant
theories of international law and relations are incapable of departing from this
basic assumption. Thus, they fail to capture the increasing influence of private
power in the global political economy. "Conventional" schools of thought
such as legal positivism and political realism, for example, continue to regard
states as the essential actors in the global realm. And even "unconventional"
theories such as critical legal studies mostly reproduce the distinction between
state and non-state, public and private, politics and economics.
However, Cutler argues, it is "simply unhistoric to posit the distinction
as a natural division, for it has not always figured as part of the natural world"
(p. 58). The transnational law created by merchants-also referred to as lex
mercatoria-serves as an example to support her claim. Historically it has
evolved in three phases.
In the Middle Ages, the lex mercatoria indeed operated as an
autonomous private legal order. Since feudal society was based on vertical
and disaggregated sovereignty, no authority able or willing to regulate long-
distance trade existed. Furthermore, foreign merchants were appreciated for
providing revenues and supplies of foreign goods. They enjoyed exemption
from local discipline, such as just price requirements, and could follow their
own customs. The lex mercatoria could easily adapt to evolving commercial
practices and was essentially self-disciplinary. Disputes were settled by
private arbitration praised for its speed, informality, and efficiency.
Enforcement mechanisms included sanctions such as market exclusion,
bankruptcy, or loss of reputation.
Only with the rise of the Westphalian nation-state in the seventeenth
century was the law merchant localized and nationalized. Sovereign national
governments replaced the overlapping authority structures of the medieval
period. Law creation, dispute settlement, and legal enforcement became
functions of the public sphere.
Yet the most recent phase in this legal evolution, which according to
Cutler dates from the beginning of the twentieth century but probably reached
its peak after the end of the Cold War, seems to be bringing about a "re-
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medievalization of the world" (p. 51). Cutler describes how a "global
mercatocracy"-a transnational commercial elite committed to neo-liberalism
and capitalism-is globalizing merchant law (p. 180). On the one hand,
nongovernmental organizations strive to unify and harmonize trade law. The
terms of trade (Incoterms) elaborated by the International Chamber of
Commerce, for instance, reflect such an effort. On the other hand,
transnational corporations create global law through the routine repetition of
standardized contractual relationships. For dispute settlement they rely on
private arbitration established by mutual agreement.
Thus, "while transnational corporations and private business
associations may be objects at law (de jure), they are, in fact, operating as
subjects (de facto)" (p. 249). As Cutler emphasizes, transnational business
arrangements have political and distributional repercussions well beyond the
parties involved. Not only do they enable transnational corporations to evade
the application of mandatory national consumer protection, taxation, or
antitrust legislation, but they also "reinscribe asymmetrical power relations"
(p. 243). To the extent that the commercial customs and practices of the global
economy represent those of the dominant U.S.-based corporations, the
interests of less-developed states, smaller businesses, and domestic consumer
groups remain underrepresented.
Cutler discusses a wide range of literature from the political, legal, and
social sciences to make her point. But her highly theoretical account would
have benefited from some concrete examples. The lack of specific support for
her arguments also gives rise to doubt: are states not still indispensable for
transforming unification proposals into binding law and enforcing private
arbitral awards? Cutler replies that soft law can "acquire binding force
through the voluntary adoption by parties in their contracts" (p. 205).
Moreover, she argues, public policy exceptions to the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards are "significant only in theory and not in practice" (p. 230).
But these assertions can hardly conceal that states keep the final say in the
global legal arena. States are also able to intervene in the international
economy well before the enforcement of private arbitration awards becomes a
question; as even multinational corporations have to incorporate in a specific
jurisdiction, the states could restrict their activity if national interests were
threatened.
If Cutler's analysis is correct, the reconfiguration of authority in the
global political economy portends a "crisis of legitimacy" for international
law. At some point, the "disjunction or asymmetry between theory and
practice ... [will become] so great that it strains the foundations of the order"
(p. 241). Cutler, therefore, makes the case for an alternative "theory of
international law as praxis" which should be "capable of theorizing law as
both a material and an ideological force operating with a public and a private
face" (pp. 261, 99).
Yet this theory leaves the reader unsatisfied in two regards. First, its
contours remain rather vague. Second and more importantly, it does not offer
a solution to the normative problems caused by expanded private governance:
"Private authority over law-creation and dispute settlement . . . raises
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important concerns about public participation and democratic accountability
and legitimacy" (p. 28). If Cutler's scenario of the eclipse of the nation-state
were true, the ultimate challenge for legal theory would be to develop
strategies to subjugate the global law-making process to democratic values
and maintain the rule of law.
Critical Perspectives on Economic Development
International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third
World Resistance. By Balakrishnan Rajagopal. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003. Pp. xvi, 343. Price: $29.00 (Paperback).
Reviewed by Marek Grabowski.
In International Law from Below, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Professor of
Law and Development and Director of the Program on Human Rights and
Justice at MIT, argues that scholarship on international law exhibits a Western
and elitist bias, as exemplified by its complete failure to acknowledge the
crucial role that Third World social movements played in the transformation
of international law over the last century. Rajagopal aims to fill this gap. By
applying a "social movement perspective" to international law, Rajagopal tells
the reader at the outset that he hopes to resolve some of the field's current
weaknesses-its blindness to the significant informal interaction between
various Third World actors, its exclusive focus on states and individuals as
recipients of rights, and its persistent view of development as beneficial,
rather than harmful, to the Third World (p. 3). Yet while these introductory
statements and the book's title suggest that his narrative will be about legal
transformation with a focus on social movements, subsequent chapters read
more like individual essays of varying relevance to Rajagopal's stated
objectives.
Only the final two chapters focus on social movements, and the
arguments Rajagopal makes in them fail to support his larger goals. It is not
until the penultimate chapter that Rajagopal even offers a definition of a social
movement: an informal network, organized around a common identity and
belief system, which engages with cultural or political conflicts (pp. 238-39).
Yet at the same time, he admits that the phrase has multiple meanings, and he
never explains his chosen definition. Moreover, Rajagopal argues vaguely that
analyzing international law in terms of social movements is "more rewarding"
than focusing on either states or individuals (p. 236). He then describes how
his so-called social movement perspective, by looking beyond states and
individuals as international actors, raises several alternatives to the prevailing
theories about legal rights and duties. For example, collective, community-
based property rights differ from existing views of sharply defined private and
state-owned property. Yet Rajagopal simply describes these different legal
theories as potential alternatives to current ideas, without providing either a
method or a rationale for making changes to the existing international legal
system in which states and institutions continue to predominate.
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In his final chapter, Rajagopal focuses on a particular social movement,
the Working Women's Forum of India, which helps poor Indian women
organize themselves into local groups in order to obtain bank loans. The
Working Women's Forum eludes easy categorization. A grassroots
organization, it is registered as a nongovernmental organization (NGO) with
the Indian government and is viewed as a women's movement within the
human rights sphere, yet it challenges all three designations. The group works
locally and largely informally, responding to the particular needs of some of
India's least advantaged women, and it remains disconnected from
international law at the institutional or NGO level. Yet it is more meaningful
to the people who really need it than any of the more established institutions
or NGOs.
Rajagopal focuses on social movements because he believes they offer a
way to rethink and reshape international law. Yet this final case study
illustrates the limits of his subject: groups such as the Working Women's
Forum by their nature will not serve as the basis for a new international order
to displace the state-centered paradigm. The Forum's principal success lies in
its concrete response to a particular, local problem facing a defined group.
Like similar organizations, the group exists below the international and state
level and has no aspirations to contest the law handed down from those levels.
Thus, even as social movements successfully multiply, state-centered
international law will likely persist.
While the final two chapters return to the social movement theme that
Rajagopal outlined in the preface and introduction, and which is purportedly
the subject of his analysis, there are seven interceding chapters where the
author does little to advance his argument. For instance, in one chapter, he
challenges the traditional depiction of the League of Nations Mandate system,
but does so without employing his own social movement perspective. He
argues that the Mandate system represents a link between colonialism and the
development discourse that arose in the decades after World War II, with the
emergence of newly independent states in the Third World. Thus, traditional
narratives that depict the post-World War II development agenda as a clean
break with the colonial past overlook the crucial role played by the League of
Nations as the colonial model of administration incrementally evolved into the
Mandate System and eventually into the U.N. Trusteeship system. Yet
Rajagopal's portrayal of Western elites as the major actors in the
transformation process, and the Third World as merely the passive recipient of
Western ideas, actually justifies the portrayal of international legal
transformation as a Western and elitist phenomenon. How does this portrayal
fit with Rajagopal's argument about international law "from below?" The
reader is left to wonder.
In his chapter dealing with the Bretton Woods institutions, Rajagopal
introduces social movements as actors, but exaggerates their importance
beyond what his evidence supports. He argues that the operations of the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) today have emerged
from a complex interaction between internal, pragmatic concerns and "popular
resistance"-a term that Rajagopal uses without specifying whether he refers
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to resistance by social movements, or by people in general (p. 97). Yet neither
of the two broad policy changes that the author discusses-the institutions'
increased interest in the alleviation of poverty and their growing concern with
the environment-supports his argument about the importance of popular
resistance. With respect to the alleviation of poverty, Rajagopal argues that
although the founding articles of the IMF and the World Bank contained no
provisions about supporting poor states, these institutions nevertheless began
doing so shortly after World War II. Yet he admits that they looked to
development primarily to improve the security of Western nations, not due to
any Third World influence, much less interaction with social movements. The
World Bank's concern with environmental protection can at least ostensibly
be attributed to outside forces, at least in the two examples of Bank policy
changes that Rajagopal provides-the Polonroeste highway in Brazil and
Narmada Dam in India-where the World Bank withdrew its funding for
large, potentially environmentally disastrous projects. In the Polonoroeste
case, Rajagopal summarizes these outside forces as consisting of the "US
media, US Congress and... NGOs worldwide" (p. 121). In other words, the
shift came about as a result of Western and elite pressure. He makes no
mention of social movements. Discussing the Narmada Dam project,
Rajagopal does mention "vigorous social movements" that, combined with
NGOs, eventually caused the World Bank to withdraw funding (p. 124).
However, the actual role or influence of the social movements, as opposed to
the NGOs or other actors, is neither described nor evaluated. Thus, by
Rajagopal's own evidence, policy shifts at these massive financial institutions
occur through interaction with multiple external forces; social movements are
only one explanatory variable among others.
Despite its almost reflexive criticism of the West, this book remains a
valuable read. Contrary to the author's objectives, most of its arguments
support rather than challenge the idea that international law is a Western and
elitist concept. Yet the final chapters offer a provocative view of social
movements and their potential to effect change on the ground, a potential that
international institutions and NGOs have often failed to demonstrate.
The Paradox of Wealth and Poverty: Mapping the Ethical Dilemmas of
Global Development. By Daniel Little. Westview Press 2003. Pp. xx,
283. Price $29.00 (Paperback). Reviewed by Sandra Kiapi.
Many observers look at the glaring economic disparities between rich
and poor nations and just despair. It seems impossible for the poorest African
countries in particular, states such as Tanzania, Nigeria, and Uganda, to
advance to a level of development anywhere close to that of the United States.
Yet Daniel Little, Chancellor of the University of Michigan-Dearborn, is an
idealist. In The Paradox of Wealth and Poverty: Mapping the Ethical
Dilemmas of Global Development, he puts forward an ambitious vision of
economic development and concludes that it can be achieved the world over.
This optimism seems somewhat excessive, however, if one considers the facts
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on the ground. The experience of several African countries shows that Little
has identified real inequities in global development, but it also brings into
question the feasibility of his suggestions.
The case for greater global equality, Little argues, is deeply rooted in
Western philosophy and ethics. He proposes an Aristotelian model of
development that envisages human happiness in terms of people's ability to
formulate goals and plans and to bring them to fulfillment. This ethic, Little
concludes, provides a powerful and compelling vision of the meaning and
fullness of human life. As such, it is complemented by Kant's view that all
people have intrinsic moral worth. Based on these two philosophies, Little
argues throughout the book that individual well-being should be at the center
of the development agenda, and that alleviating poverty should be the core
mission of economic development.
But when he turns from theory to facts, Little finds that the world looks
far different from the Artistotelian and Kantian ideal. He undertakes a clear,
comprehensive, well-informed empirical survey of global development, using
World Bank and United Nations Development Program statistics and data.
This evidence illustrates what Little sees as the two central paradoxes of
global development: first, the emergence of a civil, liberal constitutionalism in
many regions of the world at the same time as ethnic violence threatens the
lives and dignity of millions; and, second, rapid economic advancement that
still leaves billions living in persistent, debilitating poverty. Indeed, in one
striking finding, the World Bank estimates that out of a total of 6 billion, some
2.8 billion people live on less than $2 a day.
Having articulated these two paradoxes, Little uses the rest of the book
to further dissect the gaps between the haves and the have-nots, and to offer
his own perspectives on how best to approach international development. For
example, he strongly advocates improving the quality of life of the labor force
in the developing world through increased wages and better working
conditions. Such a strategy fits with his Kantian belief in individual dignity,
which is compromised in those developing states where labor standards are
not a major concern.
Interestingly, although Little advocates respect for individual dignity as
a core philosophy to guide global development, he does not propose centering
the development discourse on a human rights agenda. Human rights theory, in
his view, is too limited to serve as the moral basis for economic development.
He argues that human rights policies should focus on the "core" civil,
personal, and political rights enumerated in the first fourteen clauses of the
UN Declaration of Human Rights, which are "most critical to [people's]
ability to function as free persons, and . . . most likely to be assaulted by
corrupt and powerful governments" (p. 145). By contrast, "the moral domain
of economic development" is much broader, including the right to subsistence,
to fulfill one's maximum human potential, and the right to effective labor
organization-all "moral goods that are independent of human rights" (p.
151). In this, however, Little may be underestimating the usefulness of the
human rights dimension. Human rights discourse has progressed far since
1948-it now recognizes and promotes economic, social, and cultural rights
Recent Publications
that could not only enhance the human well-being about which Little feels so
strongly but also help support development in the poorest countries. Of
particular importance is the need to promote the right to basic health. Just like
poverty breeds poor health, poor health breeds poverty. The deaths of millions
of people due to HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, have had a
severe impact on the quality and quantity of the labor force.
Little also devotes a chapter to globalization and the obligations it
creates for developed nations, international institutions, consumers, and
citizens. The Washington Consensus, the neoliberal economic agenda put
forth by the Washington-based international financial institutions after the end
of the Cold War, required several developing countries to implement
structural adjustment programs that often included such elements as
privatization and an end to government price subsidies. But these programs
led to worker layoffs in some cases, resulting in higher unemployment levels
that in turn increased inequality. Little argues that development assistance
cannot fit into the cookie-cutter mold of liberalism and free markets
demanded by the Washington Consensus. Instead, policymakers must take
into account the particular needs of individual countries. Moreover,
sufficiently "generous and effective" foreign aid packages must "flow in
volumes that are sufficient to contribute to sustained and measurable progress
toward poverty alleviation," must be targeted toward that end, and must be
well administered (p. 186). Loans also have a place in development policy,
but Little contends that citizens must scrutinize the "priorities
effectiveness and sincerity" of the multilateral lending institutions in order to
avoid the problems created by the 1990s liberalization agenda (p. 186).
Little further proposes an ambitious set of policy goals intended to
minimize the environmental damage caused by economic growth. He
acknowledges that "the most basic threats to environmental quality," such as
population growth and more intensive use of natural resources, are "part and
parcel of modernization, economic growth, and the enhancement of global
human well-being" (p. 207). Given this inherent tension between
environmental protection and economic development, policymakers' "only
credible position" is to pursue sustainable development strategies that would
include targeted population policy, investments in more energy-efficient
technologies, and state regulation of the environmental impact of economic
activity (p. 206). These needs are particularly pressing in the developing
world, where economic growth has led to environmental damage as
multinational corporations and indigenous companies have taken advantage of
lax government regulations or political corruption to operate in a way
destructive to the natural environment and the health of the local communities.
In Nigeria, for example, the Nigerian National Oil Company and the Shell
Petroleum Development Corporation entered a joint venture to exploit oil
reserves in the Niger Delta. Yet their project produced toxic wastes that
severely contaminated the water, soil, and air of the surrounding region,
leading to serious health problems among the local Ogoni people, such as skin
infections, gastrointestinal and respiratory ailments, increased cancer rates,
and neurological and reproductive complications. Thus, although Little does
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not discuss this specific example, he does rightly emphasize the need to
protect air and water quality in order to preserve human health-a vital
component of the development process.
Little presents an attractive ideal: a world devoid of inequalities, a world
in which people achieve their full potential, a world where everyone has a
fairly comfortable standard of living, a world of harmony, and a world that
most developing countries have had a part in creating. His ideas reflect the
socialist slogan of the "common good" as opposed to the capitalist "everyman
for himself." But can this ideal in fact become reality? Julius Nyerere tried to
create a socialist state in Tanzania in the early 1980s, but his nationalization
projects ultimately impoverished the country. Tanzania is now the second
poorest nation in Africa. More fundamentally, can Little's proposals become
anything more than that when capitalist and individualistic principles
dominate the West and drive much of the existing development agenda? Will
the elites of the development establishment care about the ethics of their work
as long as its legality is not in question? Given the likely negative answers to
these questions, while Little's goals are desirable, his proposals for how they
can be achieved are unrealistic.
